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     ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper considers the need for a more pro active approach which facilitates greater on site work 
being carried out by supervisors – as highlighted in the Legal and General Case. It also considers the 
recommendations made to the UK’s regulator - the FSA, and in particular to the FSA Board, 
following the Legal and General Case. The recommendations are compared to the Basel Committee’s 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. In drawing a comparison, the importance of 
independent verification of work carried out by external auditors, be it through on-site examinations 
or the use of external experts, is once again emphasised. The involvement of external auditors or other 
experts in the supervisory process should not relieve a regulator from on site supervisory 
responsibilities. As vital as an external auditor’s work is, it is also important to verify such work. 
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THE NEED FOR GREATER PRO ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT BY REGULATORS IN 
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL 
AND GENERAL CASE 
 
An extension of the external auditor’s role depends on the nature and environment of the national 
supervisor.1 For example, the assistance that might be required of the external auditor will usually be 
minimal where the banking supervisor follows an active approach, with frequent and rigorous 
inspection.2 If however, there has been a history of less direct supervision, which is mainly based on 
the analysis of reported information provided by bank’s management, as opposed to inspection, or if 
supervisory resources are limited, the assistance that the external auditor can offer in providing 
assurance on the information obtained could be of immense benefit to the supervisor.3  
 
Many countries however, are currently practising a supervisory approach which combines elements of 
inspection and analysis of reported information.4 Inspection is proving more and more demanding in 
terms of supervisory resources even as banking becomes more complex.5 As a result, many 
supervisory authorities that practice on-site inspection are being driven to place greater reliance on 
reported information, and look to the external auditor for assistance in those areas for which the 
auditor’s skills are particularly suited.6 
 
In countries where banking supervisors have previously relied on their analysis of prudential returns, 
they have found that a certain degree of on-the-spot examination is a desirable safeguard, therefore in 
these countries, the supervisors are relying more than ever before on external auditors to assist them 
by performing specific tasks. Whereas in those countries where communication between external 
auditors and banking supervisors have been close over a long period, a bond of mutual trust has been 
built up and extended experience of collaboration has enabled each to benefit from the other’s work. 
Experience in those countries also indicates that the conflicts of interest that auditors may in principle 
perceive as preventing close collaboration with supervisors assume less importance in practice and do 
not present an obstacle to a fruitful dialogue. 
 
The Basel Committee for banking supervision has highlighted the need for a continuing dialogue 
between banking supervisors and the accountancy/audit profession.7 Other reasons for the need of 
external auditors include:8 
 
1) Banking supervisors need to be making greater use of external auditors if they are to meet the 
requirements of the Basel Principles (Core Principles for effective Banking Supervision) 
2) The increasing supervisory focus on corporate governance and on internal controls will 
require supervisors to take account of the views of external auditors 
3) The increasing sophistication of control and risk management systems requires the expertise 
of external auditors 
4) Increased reliance on IT systems requires the expertise of external auditors 
5) Move of banking supervision to oversight of process rather than detailed examination requires 
skills which can be provided by external auditors 
                                                 
1 „The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks’ External Auditors: Additional Requests for the 
External Auditor to Contribute to the Supervisory Process’ January 2002 (page 12) paragraph 64: also see 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf>  
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
4 ibid paragraph 65 
5 ibid 
6 ibid 
7 The Role of External Auditors in Financial Services Supervision, Report by Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
8 Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 1997, Basel Committee Publications No 30 
(September 1997); http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.htm; also see „The Relationship between Bank Supervisors 
and External Auditors“, Basel Committee Publications No 87 January 2002 
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6) The perception of a conflict of interest between the role of reporting to shareholders and that 
of reporting to supervisors is more apparent than real and is addressed by appropriate guidance 
and standards, including principles laid down by the Basel Committee. 
 
In jurisdictions where greater use of external auditors is required (and also in cases where there is less 
need of external auditors), this should not serve as justification for a corresponding degree of reliance 
on such external auditors’ work. In jurisdictions where the banking supervisor follows an active 
approach, such direct involvement in the supervisory process should be maintained and greater 
involvement encouraged. In those jurisdictions where there is greater need for external auditors (where 
less direct supervision is undertaken by supervisors),  this should indicate the need for safeguards – in 
the form of greater proactive involvement by banking supervisors in the supervisory process.  
 
Off-site and On-site Systems of Supervision 
 
According to the Core Principles9  for Effective Banking Supervision 1997, an effective banking 
supervisory system should consist of some kind of both “on-site” and “off-site” supervision. 
 
Offsite Supervision 
 
Off-site supervision is  synonymous with monitoring and involves the regulator making use of external 
auditors. It also involves the receipt and analysis of financial statements and statistical returns 
submitted to the supervisors.10 Such analysis of the information promotes the monitoring of each 
bank's performance and the observance of supervisory requirements from time to time.11 Off-site 
monitoring often has the benefits of being able to identify potential problems, particularly during 
intervals between on-site inspections, thereby providing early detection and acting as trigger for 
corrective action before problems become more serious.12 
 
 
Onsite Supervision 
 
On-site work is usually done by the examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or 
commissioned by supervisors but may be undertaken by external auditors.13 On site supervision is 
synonymous with inspections and as well as providing on-site checks on a bank's operations and 
condition, they enable off-site supervision data to be verified.14 With the use of samples instead of full 
audits, inspectors can concentrate on the bank's accounting and control systems, its compliance to 
policies and procedures and arrive at conclusions about management capabilities15. At present, the 
external auditor assists the FSA through a mixed system of supervision whereby the FSA inspects 
banks (on-site) and utilises external auditors (off-site). The systems in the UK and Germany16 involve 
both on-site and off-site supervision whilst Italy to a greater degree, is based on the on-site system 
                                                 
9  Principle 20, Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, September 1997 
10 D Quiroz Rendon, ' The Formal Regulatory Approach to Banking Regulation' Badell & Grau Legal 
Consultants, see <http://www.badellgrau.com/legalbanking.html> (last visited 10 June 2008) pg 20 of 26 
11 ibid 
12  ' The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors' Jan 2002 para 40 page 11 see 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 11th July 2007) 
13  'The Relationship between Bank Supervisors and External Auditors' (Basel Committee Publications No. 87 
January 2002) 
 
14 D Quiroz Rendon, ' The Formal Regulatory Approach to Banking Regulation' Badell & Grau Legal 
Consultants, see <http://www.badellgrau.com/legalbanking.html> (last visited 10 June 2008) pg 20 of 26 
15 ibid 
16  For Germany, see Gesetz ueber das Kreditwesen, <http://www.bafin.de/gesetz/kwg.htm> (12 Aug 
2005); Gesetz ueber die Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, section 1 (Erster Abschnitt) 
<http://www.bafin.de/gesetze/findag.htm > (12 Aug 2005) 
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(even though it still makes use of external auditors). The US position is based on an on-site system of 
supervision and is focussed on the aim of using external audit to examine financial institutions, but it 
does not extend beyond that (as it does in the UK where extra auditor functions are acquired).17 
 
 
It should be emphasised that pro-active involvement by regulators does not merely infer greater on-site 
supervisions but also the actual involvement of regulators in the supervisory process. A more 
proactive approach role to regulation was suggested by Mr Ronald Baker, an ex Head of Financial 
Products Group, Barings Investment Bank.18 In this report, Mr Baker gave his experience of working 
for American banks – that there was a more proactive role taken by the regulators in New York in 
terms of having people on the trading floor. In the US, periodic on-site examinations are carried out 
and justified on the basis of the large number of small banks and on unit banking within particular 
states.19 Unlike jurisdictions where authorities place reliance on outside experts, bank supervisors in 
the US must possess skills in order to evaluate asset quality and other areas governing a bank’s 
activities.20 The disadvantage in this is that it can be labour intensive and restricted by budgetary 
constraints.21 US supervisory authorities have responded to resource constraints in recent years by 
making greater use of off-site surveillance systems.22 However, the use of off-site surveillance systems 
could also be disadvantageous as computers cannot observe certain aspects of examinations, namely, 
the scrutiny of management practices.23 
 
 
Enforcement of Accounting/Audit Principles 
 
Enforcement can be defined as all procedures in a country in order to assure the proper application of 
accounting principles. Enforcement procedures are necessary in order to ensure that accounting and 
regulatory standards are being complied with. A good compliance culture can be defined as one which 
functions in accordance to the regulatory standards imposed on it. Enforcement can also be considered 
to be a constitution of several components such as clear accounting standards, prompt interpretation 
and implementation guidance, statutory audit, monitoring by supervisors and effective sanctions. 
Although all these components are important and each of these need to work effectively, the statutory 
audit function, which ensures appropriate application of accounting standards, has to be carried out 
according to uniformly high standards across the EU. 
 
The enforcement of audit standards appears in most European countries at 6 levels namely: 
 
Preparation of financial statements 
 
Statutory audit of financial statements 
 
Approval of financial statements 
 
Institutional oversight systems 
 
Court: sanctions and complaints 
 
Public and press reactions 
                                                 
17  More information  on this : D Singh 'Banking Regulation of UK Financial Markets' 
18  Barings Bank and International Regulation, Minutes of Evidence, Tuesday 23 July 1996 at page 101 
19  V Polizatto, ‚Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional Framework for  
 Banks’ (1990) World Bank Working Paper January 1990 at p 17 
20  ibid 
21  ibid 
22  ibid 
23  See ‘Off-site Surveillance Systems’< http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol2/panel2.pdf > 
(last visited 15 February 2009). Also see advantages and disadvantages of  Off site Monitoring on pp 479, 480 
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The Role of Courts in the Enforcement Process 
 
In addition to Re Pearl Assurance (Unit Linked Pensions) Ltd and Re:Hill Samuel Life Assurance 
Limited, Re Equitable Life Assurance Society,24 further defined the role not only of the independent 
expert, but also of the Court in deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion. The facts of 
Equitable Life are as follows: Equitable Life, an insurance company, made an application for a 
sanction of a transfer scheme, under section 111 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA).25 The Transfer Scheme involved the transfer of part of the insurance business being 
conducted by Equitable Life to Canada Life. The FSA had been consulted in the preparation of the 
Scheme. Even though Canada Life’s ultimate parent company was incorporated in Canada, because 
Canada Life was authorised to carry on insurance business in the UK by the FSA, it was subject to the 
FSA’s supervision. An independent expert, a partner in KPMG LLP, was authorised by the FSA to 
assess and report on the Scheme. It concluded that the different categories of policyholders would not 
be affected adversely by the Scheme. Hence, the FSA considered the Scheme to be satisfactory. In 
considering whether it was appropriate to sanction the Scheme, the Court not only referred to sections 
105,111,112 FSMA, but also the leading authority of RE London Life Association Ltd where the 
Insurance Companies Act 1982 schedule 2c, predecessor of section 111 FSMA was considered. 
Applying the same principle used in that case, the Court decided that since the scheme on the whole 
was fair, it would make no alterations just because of certain individual provisions. 
 
It was stated in Re Equitable that the process culminating in the Court’s sanction was designed to 
ensure that the transfer scheme was fair to those relying on the parties to the arrangement to provide 
their pensions, namely the policyholders. In addition, it was stated that it was to ensure such fairness 
that the FSA has a supervisory role and appointed an independent expert to rely on the scheme. The 
Court therefore was not convinced by various submissions of policyholders that the views of the 
independent expert should be disregarded and that the Court’s sanction to the Scheme was to be 
refused. Mr Justice Rimer’s statement in Re:Hill Samuel Life Assurance Limited, illustrates the 
importance of the role of an independent expert. Where the Court considers the report or opinion of 
the expert as sufficient, it could be difficult for various submissions, including those of the FSA, to 
succeed. This is further illustrated in Legal and General. In Legal and General, even though the court 
agreed that the FSA was justified in asserting that Legal and General had in certain cases missold low 
cost with profits endowment policies, this was only justified in relation to those cases. The FSA’s 
claims regarding the extent of the misselling was not accepted as there was insufficient proof to 
provide such justification. In other words, the Court chose to rely on the opinion of the external 
auditor who had carried out the assessment and who had arrived at the conclusion the sample size used 
was not representative enough. 
 
 
Enforcement by the UK’s financial services regulator (the FSA) 
 
Enforcement by the FSA 
 
The FSA, in considering disciplinary action, has tried to focus on the organisation concerned as 
opposed to individuals.26 At the same time, considerable efforts are being made to highlight concerns 
                                                 
24   [2007] EWHC 229 (Ch) 
25   Section 111 FSMA lists the requirements to be fulfilled before a court may grant an order 
sanctioning an insurance business transfer scheme or a banking business transfer scheme. Section 105 FSMA 
provides the requirements in order to be classified as an insurance business transfer scheme. Sections 105 and 
111 constitute part of Part VII of the FSMA which deals with the control of transfers of insurance businesses. 
Equitable also sought ancillary orders under section 112 of the Act. 
26   R Turner 'The Interaction between FSA Enforcement Action and Compliance Culture: A Help or a 
Hindrance?' Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance Volume 13 Number 2 2005, Henry Stewart 
Publications at p 144 
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which emanate from the apparent lack of management oversight.27 The difficulty in reconciling the 
desire of senior management to operate a compliant business and the ability of the organisation to 
deliver according to the standards expected by the FSA has been attributed partly to inadequate 
training, processes or understanding of allocated responsibilities.28 
In order for the enforcement tool to be effective, it must justify the act for which it has been imposed. 
As mentioned previously, the public “naming and shaming” by means of press communication is very 
effective as companies will try to avoid their name and reputation from being tarnished. However, as 
the Legal and General Case  has highlighted, not all regulated institutions may accept such sanctions.  
Following the Legal and General Case, an Enforcement Process Review was set up to review the use 
of, approach to and decision-making process for supervisory actions and enforcement actions to 
address breaches of regulatory requirements and, where appropriate, to make recommendations.29 The 
review evaluated the lessons from the FSA’s experience over the last three years under the Financial 
Services & Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) regime including the comments of the Tribunal in the Legal & 
General case but did not explore any options which would require changes to FSMA.30 The review 
considered the procedures followed by supervisors, enforcement staff and decision makers in 
considering possible breaches of statutory or regulatory requirements, and the nature and extent of the 
communications and interactions between them; the role and involvement of senior FSA management 
throughout these processes; options for making regulatory decisions based on a fair procedure by 
persons separate from the investigators; and the accountability of decision makers to the FSA Board. 
 
 
 
Recommendations made to the FSA Board following the Legal and General Case include four key 
principles for the FSA's enforcement process review that have driven the Review’s recommendations 
and these are:31 That the FSA should provide: a clear view of its holistic approach to the use of 
enforcement; adequate safeguards and controls to help ensure balance and fairness during the 
investigation phase32; transparency for those subject to enforcement action so that they are well-
informed about the case they have to answer and the evidence on which it is based; and clarity as to 
the distinction (required by FSMA) between those who investigate a case and those who decide33. 
                                                 
27 ibid 
28  ibid 
29   <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> at p 65 
30  ibid 
31  <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> pp 13 -15 (last visited 10  October 
2008) 
32  As the FSA is a risk-based regulator, it has to focus its limited resources on those issues which are 
likely to have greatest impact on its statutory objectives. As a valid enforcement tool, a practical consequence of 
the risk based approach  is that the FSA cannot, and does not, attempt to investigate every rule breach. The FSA 
instead, selects cases carefully, according to their seriousness and its priorities. The Review recommends no 
change to this approach but it is important that the FSA continues to explain how it will use enforcement to help 
meet its objectives and what the practical consequences of this are for firms and consumers. 
 To help facilitate the decision-making process functions most effectively, investigations must be of a 
high quality and any alleged breaches properly supported by evidence. A number of recommendations to 
strengthen the investigation process and one which is particularly recommended by the Review, is that before a 
case is referred to the decision makers, there be a thorough legal review by lawyers in the Enforcement Division 
who are not part of the investigation team. This is not generally current practice; ibid 
 
33 In order to operate fairly and in order to be seen as operating fairly, there must be separation between 
those who investigate possible rule breaches and those who decide whether the conduct in question should be 
sanctioned within the FSA's enforcement process. This fundamental distinction in respect of decision-making is 
required by FSMA, but its terms are sufficiently wide to allow the FSA considerable flexibility as to how it 
achieves this. 
 Currently, the FSA facilitates this separation by entrusting the more foundational and contentious 
regulatory decision making to the RDC. The RDC is a Committee of the FSA’s Board, but operationally 
independent of it. Apart from the Review recommending that the RDC be maintained and that its membership 
continue to include practitioners and non-practitioners, the FSA Board is also to maintain its current policy of 
non intervention in, or attempting to influence, the RDC’s individual decisions; ibid 
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Other recommendations include the fact that the FSA is to continue to promote transparency about its 
risk-based approach to enforcement and the consequences flowing from it, particularly for case 
selection.34 The FSA Board and the Executive are to consider at least once a year, the approach to 
enforcement and how this tool can be utilised to help achieve its overall objectives.35 The FSA's 
enforcement approach for medium-sized and smaller firms is also to be developed and communicated 
to complement its approaches for the larger and for the smallest firms.36 
 
 
Comparing the Recommendations to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 'Core Principles 
For Effective Banking Supervision' October 2006 
 
Principle 1 – Objectives, independence, powers, transparency and cooperation: An effective system 
of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the 
supervision of banks. Each such authority should possess operational independence, transparent 
processes, sound governance and adequate resources, and be accountable for the discharge of its 
duties. Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of 
such information should be in place.  
 
The principle which influenced the review's recommendations that the FSA should provide sufficient 
measures during the investigation phase of the enforcement process to deliver balance and fairness, 
transparency for those subject to enforcement action, and clarity as to the separation between those 
who investigate a case and those who decide it37 is similar to principle 1 of the Basel Core Principles. 
The review's decision to maintain the Regulatory Decisions Committee (RDC) was also aimed at 
promoting accountability.38 Specific recommendations relating to the RDC were also aimed at 
ensuring that there were no longer confidential communications between Enforcement and the RDC.39 
  
Principle 21 – Supervisory reporting: Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and 
analysing prudential reports and statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, 
and a means of independent verification of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of 
external experts. 
Several respondents believed that senior management from Supervision and Enforcement should have 
a greater involvement in the enforcement process and that this would immensely improve the 
perception of fairness.40 As regards the involvement of supervisors during the investigation phase, 
supervisors of a firm are not as a general rule, directly involved in an investigation which is being 
pursued by Enforcement.41 This approach has its advantages in maintaining a clear division between 
the conduct of the investigation on the one hand and the need to maintain the supervisory relationship 
with the firm on the other.42 At the same time this division of responsibility may mean that the 
investigation does not benefit as much as it might otherwise do from the knowledge of the firm or 
individuals that the supervisor will have built up, nor from the general understanding of the firm’s 
business or sector that the supervisor may be able to contribute.43 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
34  ibid p 29 
35  ibid 
36 ibid 
37  See < 
http://www.lovells.com/Lovells/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/FSA+ENFORCEMENT+REVIEW.htm> 
38  The Review found  that the RDC was effective in providing clear separation between those who 
investigated possible rule breaches and those who decide whether the conduct in question should be sanctioned; 
ibid 
39  ibid 
40  <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> p 83 
41  <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf>   p 30 
42  ibid p 30 
43  ibid 
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In relation to a number of recommendations concerning matters beyond the role and operation of the 
RDC, the review recommended that before a case is referred to the decision-makers, there should be a 
review by Enforcement Division lawyers who are not part of the investigation team.44  
 
 
Expected Effect  of Recommendations 
 
Greater confidence in the FSA on the part of regulated firms and individuals, encouragement of self-
reporting, remedial action and co-operation will be facilitated by improved enforcement procedures.45 
There is a danger that firms and individuals may react by introducing over-elaborate procedures to 
protect themselves from any risk of being thought to have breached an FSA requirement where there 
are concerns about the FSA’s enforcement process in terms of case selection, conduct of the 
investigation or the decision-making process itself.46 The changes recommended by the Review will 
not only help reduce any such ‘over-compliance’ that may exist but consumers will also benefit in that 
the more judicious and well respected the enforcement process is, the more it may encourage better 
compliance by regulated firms and individuals without recourse to enforcement action.47 
It is anticipated that more cases will be settled earlier as a result of the Review’s recommendations 
which consequently should reduce costs and assist consumers, both in terms of securing redress earlier 
and sending clear reminders to firms about the standards which the FSA expects of them.48 Where 
cases do proceed to the RDC, the net effect of these recommendations will be to add to the overall 
costs of the FSA’s enforcement process hence making it lengthier.49 
 
 
 
The Role of the External Auditor as an Enforcement Tool in the Regulatory Process. 
 
According to statistics, the FSA uses the enforcement tool selectively and this is consistent with the 
fact that the FSA is not an enforcement-led regulator. Evidence also shows that the FSA has decided a 
majority of rule breaches by firms through supervisory tools rather than enforcement action.50 The 
reason for the selective use of the enforcement tool can be attributed to the fact that it is a relatively 
expensive tool. As well as highlighting the importance of the FSA's reliance on work carried out by 
external auditors and the importance of verifying such work carried out by external auditors, the Legal 
and General Case51 also contributed to the debate about the need for greater reliance on on-site 
supervision by the FSA. The case highlighted that the presence of an opinion from a skilled person – 
in particular one who works for the regulated firm and  is also paid by that firm, should merely assist 
in informing the FSA's decision making and should not act as a substitute to relieve the FSA from 
reaching its own decisions.52  
 
Comments relating to the use of skilled person reports, as defined under s166 of FSMA, were made as 
a result of seven responses to the Enforcement Process Review Report.53 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44  See 'Matters Beyond the Role and Operation of the RDC' , FSA Enforcement Review 19 May 2005 < 
http://www.lovells.com/Lovells/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/FSA+ENFORCEMENT+REVIEW.htm> 
45   <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> p 63 
46  ibid 
47  ibid 
48 ibid 
49  ibid 
50  ibid p 17 
51  Legal and General Assurance Society (L & G) v FSA 
52  See 'Drawing Conclusions From Skilled Person Reports'  p 37  para 5.38 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> 
53   http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf at p 35 
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The Reporting Accountant (Skilled Persons) 
 
Section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 deals with the powers of the FSA to 
obtain a report by a skilled person (reporting accountant) to assist the FSA in performing its functions 
under FSMA 2000. Under sections 167 and 168 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the 
FSA also has the powers to appoint competent persons to carry out investigations. The differences 
between the roles of reporting accountants (now known as skilled persons) and competent persons are 
demonstrated by the bearer of the costs for work carried out by these persons. For work undertaken by 
skilled persons, the bank bears the cost directly whilst for work undertaken by competent persons, the 
FSA bears the cost.54 The role of the reporting accountant has become so important that it will be 
incorporated into the entire regulated sector.55  Even though skilled persons are usually approved by 
the FSA, the role is usually performed by auditors of the regulated firm.56 This raises the question of 
independence since both roles of auditors of the regulated firm and skilled persons employed by the 
FSA (reporting accountants) are distinct roles which still overlap occasionally.57  
 
The use of skilled persons' reports has been controversial and concerns have been expressed in relation 
to the FSA using a skilled person's report instead of devoting its own resources to investigating a 
matter.58 As well as highlighting the importance of the FSA's reliance on work carried out by external 
auditors and the importance of verifying such work carried out by external auditors, the Legal and 
General Case59 has also contributed to the debate about the need for greater reliance on on-site 
supervision by the FSA. The case highlighted that the presence of an opinion from a skilled person – 
in particular one who works for the regulated firm and  is also paid by that firm, should merely assist 
in informing the FSA's decision making and should not act as a substitute to relieve the FSA from 
reaching its own decisions.60 A more proactive approach which facilitates more on site work being 
carried out by supervisors was recommended. The skilled persons' reports is expected to inform the 
FSA's decision making and in cases where the reports are used, the FSA would be expected to 
supplement it with additional work if necessary.61 
 
 
The normal relationship between the external auditor and the audited bank needs to be safeguarded.62 
If no other statutory requirements or contractual arrangements governing the external auditor’s work 
exist, all information flows between the banking supervisor and the auditor are usually chanelled 
through the bank except in exceptional circumstances.63 As a result, the banking supervisor will 
request the bank to arrange to obtain the information it requires from the auditor and such information 
will be submitted to the supervisor through the bank.64 In addition, the tasks that the banking 
supervisor requires of the external auditor need to be within the auditor’s technical and practical 
competence.65  
 
                                                 
54  See J Hitchins, M Hogg and D Mallett,  Banking : A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide 
(Institute of Chartered Accountants)   295 
55   D Singh,  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' (2003) 4 (3) Journal of 
International Banking Regulation  9 
56  ibid 
57 ibid 
58 ibid p 135 
59  Legal and General Assurance Society (L & G) v FSA 
60  See 'Drawing Conclusions From Skilled Person Reports'  p 37  para 5.38 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> 
61  D Singh,  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' Journal of International 
Banking Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003 at p 37 
62  For this and other safeguards, see  ' The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' 
External Auditors' Jan 2002 para 58 page 15, pages 15-17    <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 
11th July 2008) 
63  ibid 
64  ibid 
65 Ibid para 61 page 16 
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Measures have been adopted by the FSA to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest 
between the auditors of the regulated firm who are commissioned by the FSA as skilled persons but 
are paid by the regulated firm. Chapter 5 of the FSA Supervision Manual provides examples of 
circumstances where the FSA may use skilled persons. The use of skilled person reports requires 
compatibility with the circumstances envisaged by s166 of FSMA and with the further guidance set 
out in the Supervision and Enforcement manuals.66 The FSA may nominate or approve the 
appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person if it is cost effective to do so but also takes 
into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to the matter to be reported on. There are 
also defined and limited circumstances in which a firm can use skilled persons.67 The increased use of 
on site supervision with external auditors paid for by the FSA, would however reduce the potential 
problems that could arise where the FSA uses auditors of  regulated firms as skilled persons.  
Other provisions which should assist the FSA's enforcement process include statutory powers being 
conferred by sections 165-169 and section 284 of the FSMA. These deal with the right of approval or 
removal, and the right to commission an independent audit to help the banks in ensuring that external 
auditors with the required experience, resources and skills are appointed to perform their duties.68 
 
Skilled Person  Reports 
 
In addition to highlighting the importance of clarity about the nature and purpose of the report being 
commissioned, comments relating to the use of skilled person reports, as defined under s 166 of 
FSMA, also address whether the output may ultimately be used in enforcement procedures.69 One 
response questioned whether it was appropriate to use s166 reports to outsource ‘investigative’ work 
effectively70. 
It was recommended that there should be regular liaison meetings between the firm, skilled person and 
the FSA whilst work on a skilled person report was being carried out.71 This was to help identify any 
material new information which might affect the future direction of the work, consistent with SUP 
5.5.4G and if necessary, the firm’s supervisor should involve the enforcement team at an early stage 
and agree with them what the appropriate response was to any change of circumstances.72 
This recommendation should also enable the FSA, in association with the firm and skilled person to 
decide on whether changes need to be made to the scope of the work, or whether the matter was one 
for FSA staff to investigate.73 
 
The initial communication between the FSA and the firm which lead to the production of the scope of 
the skilled person report will cover the nature of the opinion which the skilled person will be required 
to give before conclusions are drawn from skilled person reports. However, the presence of an opinion 
from a skilled person does not relieve the FSA from reaching its own decision regarding a firm’s 
                                                 
66    http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf at p 36; The SUP5.3 and ENF2.3.11 
sections of the FSA Handbook set out wide range of circumstances for which a skilled person report may be 
suitable and the use of such a report for investigative (i.e. information gathering) purposes is, in the FSA’s view, 
clearly contemplated both by FSMA and its own guidance; ibid 
 
67  According to chapter 5 of the Supervision Manual, the FSA stated that firms are to appoint skilled 
persons only for specific purposes; not to use them as a matter of routine; to use skilled persons only after having 
considered alternatives; to use skilled persons because of the added value to be gained due to their expertise or 
knowledge and not because of resource restraints; to take into account cost implications and to use the tool in a 
focused and proportionate way. 
68  See E Huepkes p 10 
69  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf at p 36 
70  ibid 
71  ibid p 37 
72  ibid 
73  ibid 
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compliance with a particular set of rules – even though such an opinion will contribute to the FSA’s 
own decision-making.74 
 
Some other responses noted that, depending on who in the FSA has commissioned them, the approach 
to skilled person reports and the clarity of scope etc can vary considerably.75 Observations have also 
been made that, in particular circumstances, reports are commissioned informally when use of the 
formal s166 power would be more appropriate.76 
 
The FSA’s own internal procedures are designed to facilitate consistency of approach in the use of 
skilled person reports and this is demonstrated by specifically highlighting that if information is 
required which is best obtained through a skilled person report, then that route should be favoured 
over any other route.77 This is so not only because of the control which s166 gives the FSA over the 
scope of the report, the FSA’s right of access to it and any underlying working papers but also because 
of the co-operation and disclosure requirements which are connected both to the firm and third 
parties.78 
Concerns about inconsistent approaches being adopted by different parts of the FSA or any departures 
from the FSA’s stated policies are to be brought to the FSA’s attention - the relevant feedback 
mechanism being the annual meeting which the FSA intends to have with the main firms used for 
skilled person work.79 In the process of serious concerns emerging that cannot wait for these meetings, 
they are to be brought to the relevant supervisor's attention.80 
 
 
Following the collapse of Barings, neither the Board of Banking Supervision Report nor the Andersen 
Review of Supervision considered a total overhaul in the Bank of England’s approach to supervision. 
The predominantly “off-site” nature of the supervision undertaken by the Bank was lauded by the 
Andersen Review as being flexible and able to influence banks by persuasion and not just the force of 
law or detailed rules.81 The Treasury Committee however noted that it was partly due to the 
discretionary basis of the Bank’s approach to supervision that there was limitation in its ability to 
detect events at Barings and that some of the measures proposed in the Bank’s review would help 
reduce the scope for flexibility.82According to the Bank’s Review of Supervision,83 the Arthur 
Andersen Review (supported by the Bank’s Review of Supervision) suggests that the use of formal 
risk assessment models will mean that there is need “to bring the line supervisors into direct contact, 
on site, with a wider range of management.” 
                                                 
74  ibid p 37; In some cases a skilled person report will be used to assess whether or not compensation is 
due to a class of customer (who may have been mis-sold a particular product) or whether the amount of 
compensation has been properly calculated and in such cases, the FSA would expect to be able to rely on the 
contents of the report, or where necessary, supplement it with additional work of its own; ibid 
75  ibid 
76 ibid 
77  ibid p 38 
78  ibid 
79  ibid 
80 ibid 
81  Treasury Committee Barings Bank and International Regulation (Report No 1, 1996) xiv 
82  ibid 
83  July 1996 para 14 
